.. . 12.5mm 2c in
.-
. SA
r 7» — Milken rootvduring norm of
am
Seordfing- 'An‘aiysis-‘**- of. weakness”:
www.mm ..
tbs» outb ' of the war.
and .Bl-undcrszon Both. Side-32:13 figmjmfifiwmflg
mined in’ cafiklmr’éfiook Mich
Is 'Acciaimedgjas;
Subject -
The first “mam
-—"Review of the World War.”
But forth anonymously in Letpoicfit
.of.-'bo¢k,which has
(knowing or ”the best Mouths war.” [gin "Kritikdumgd’w
the Boston
“on-.officer of the General 8301.”
it won amenity thought-lows the work of mo! the highest warm.
- perhaps Gen. mdfookonm.
1 The
authors displayed “casual-mu ace '
» qwntancc with theater-cu of!» “do“ campaigns, as well as masterly
a sensation in Germany.
the Seventh German Army.
on the Ailit's. made.
Belgium,
Alsace-Lorraine.
Ho trlls how Germany "lost the
a rrircul.
ill“. world war has been lost by
«prurmv. The victors have
plow-d ;i h-uvy burden on tho
“Ii! :u The public is
4 our know what were the
(mm-s of the outcome. The famous
woolen) of “guilt" will not be treated
lure, for a sober verdict cannot be
un'lclieil at the present time of pas-
ivlllll and prejudice. Later generations
with clear vision and free of the influ-
ence of partisanship may be able to
arrive at. a fair judgment. Nowadays
We can say only this: The causes of
the unhappy result are to be found in
rmrly every sphere of public and eco-
wmlc life of Germany. The states-
2»: In in charge of domestic or foreign
affairs, the diplomntist. the parliamen-
‘umu. the common people as wall as
an.- wvnlthy and ccrtainly also the
mimic,- soldier, ought to beat their
counts and confess: "Pat-r. peccavi
Mimi-r l have sinned) during the
‘a ll’ iii'lli previously."
'i‘lw iultllor goes on to explain that
.. z imuk is (ii-Aligned to defend the
.. -m;m Ui-nornl Staff against un-
' innit-ii :ulvcrso criticism. though he
“riliu that numerous mistakes were
in carrying out the ambitious
. Vil‘i uf mobilization and tactical war-
mh-iu-utvd under the guidance of
111v i‘i.-!.i Marshal Schlieffen.
'l"iil.li'._\'." the preface says. "the
in -;. i» ii’ 10>: ll practical aim. Con-
e. mm : 2h.- prom-m. military situation
uni .. h ihrmnny finds herself. and
luJin‘ promising League 0! Na-
,. ,li 111'. may believe it is of no use
cowl ll)“ Vim-mien of Germany's
‘uiiill in lllililul'y affairs.
WhMliI-r ihu-n Will be future wars de-
w “m economic interests
mm mm on ideals. as the
:m- world has proved.
Ila/y A/u‘ance Begin .
' Under Like Conditions
“in 1815 the Holy Alliance came
1 . umtcnce under circumstances
11' in the League of Nations. That
was created in the some
of exhaustion and war
tuiwm. Just, as the sovereignty
in: individual States was then in-
v-w ”mm with such a. condition. Just
. llilili tilletl‘lisi. and secret egotlsm on
imrt of the pillars of the Holy
A Linu- injected into that. allianée the
i m. or (loony. Just so certain is it
‘ ihe League of Nations of 1919
mi 1m in pieces because the only
r wrunly of its existence, namely. 1
.mm l'zu'o free of weaknesses and
-v umu-s, m as non-existent to-day as
u. i: whnn the Holy Alliance was
. . mu. .‘l century before.
l‘llcl‘o-l‘i-l‘c, it will be of advantage
I) tiw- (iwl'miln people. while they are
m,- 1.1.1 and down on.the floor. to
v .. .ll i: nst an attempt to preserve
tl‘wl unhan- the intellectual and moral
: r.:.-_p- Hi' the great military past.
in.-. on“ of their recent enemies
'-'-i.l 's-rzr. Hum for their assistance and
l-‘li .. .itnin in their hands the sword
Vila 2.. mmi bllnd confidence. they
ii” imm- u few minutes too soon.
- Ti.“ heritage of men like Clause-
“l'i'rw and Schlicffen falls to
r»... ’I-Irrr‘ :2 nation in general. and to
, nth in particular. It. is the
N w: this book to awaken in our
i- ‘u'iweciation of such s. valuabiv
.1-
44’"
T
1: .wl i'Il"
[0
will,
5.1..
l
l‘l‘l«li“-‘
linim‘y . C
I. m“
" irv'i,‘
~ wplirirc
“1..
llxiicr discusses in 50““ the
rum; iriiur'lkes the Prussian general-
'.w.- m [’1‘ Austro-Prussian W” at
‘w'; {lilii lilo Fra‘nco-Pruuinn WI! 0!
hill-187i. principally their concentra-
'H>n of fumes during the mdrch to 1110
9cm and by forming small bit“.
Poms, thus throwing 1“, optic!"
luliiiica of outfianklng. surrounding
and destroying the Austrian Ind
liench armies. The author remarks:
'Ths Prussian generals adhered ‘0
"0 opinions they had drawn from in.
often misinterpreted ngoieonic pm-
"rots and from the observations of
ms maneuvers of a long 961104 °f
pom. . . . They did not in"
within; of the bottle: of annihilation-
of encircling or pursuing the on“!
or of like ‘dreams.’ Ono arrow
occupiers-position; the othsromm‘t
whos- foros is larger by on. or "'0
battalions. shocks. The defeated m
vimanwn. The victor does not
\ glli’
ifiblfiféddé ’6T '17? W17 bf Willi?" , iii? «T’s W W”;
m: book "and: alone because the writer apparently has no
grind and has the viewpoint of on unprejudlccd historian.
to confldrntial paper: of the General Stag.
(It points out a great number of mistakes which Germany. as well
He says France could hdve been brought to her
knees before the Russian steam roller was ready in the East if the Kaiser
had not weakened the German right wing. which had morched through
in order to strengthen unnecessarily the German forces in
6W
In a leoond edition. he made himself known a: Capt. H. Editor. on ex-
"Pfoln who at the end of the war was attached to the
General Stop of
ore to
He had access
war" at the Home because a mere
hrulcnoui-coloncl. at the front representing the High Command, ordered
[{c blames the extreme conservatism of the German officer
{Ul'flh‘ lor staking everything on the morale of-the troops and showing
(wimmpl o/ terhnical inventions and improvements. including the tanks.
Thm article shows among other things. Germany repeated some of
m mls/ulfii’fl of the Austin-Prussian and Franco-Pmfian wars. and how
,.wi.(:z»um.n1y 1t underestimated the value of the tank.
hamper the defeated and turns to the
problems of the next day."
Capt. Bitter says that even the
famous battles of Koeniggraetz, in
consequence of which Austria sued for
peace in 1866. and of Sedan. which re-
sulted in the capture of Emperor Na-
poleon Ill. and the overthrow of the
French monarchy. were won by the
Prussian: not because of superior but
in spite of poor leadership. The book
continues: .
"comparing the average tactical
competency of the German General
Staff and the army leaders, who had
gone through the school of the Gen-
eral Staff, of 1914 on the one side. and
of 1866 and 1870 on the other, we are
Justified in saying that of the three
foremost shortcomings of the latter
period—namely the strategy of :1er
columns previous to and during align-
ment ”*well as on the battle fields.
together with the lack of flanking
operations. lack‘of war intelligence
and finally tactics disregarding tech-
nical developments and topographical
difficulties—the first named had con-
siderably decreased. though Moltke's
(meaning the older Moltke of 1870
fame) and Schlieffen's unparalled
instructions did not pear the fruits
they so richly deserved.
"Schlieffen's precept Was that. while
columns are advancing side by side.
an attacked or sti-ongly resisted force
cannot be better assisted than by con-
tinuing the advance in the scheduled
direction. thereby getting to the flank
or even the rear of. and threatening
with nnnihilhtion the opponent fight-
ing the neighboring group of the own
army. This rule was lost sight of
time and again; German leaders
'marched in the direction of the thun-
der of guns.’ By relieving pressure on
brothers—in-arms by such tactics they
lost the ripening fruits of stratcgy.
“On August 25, 1914. for instance.
the Second Army was tempted by the
First Army to give the latter tactical
assistance, thereby missing an oppor-
tunity for fruitful operations. And
again, when the Third Army. on Au-
gust 29. was called by the Second
Army and the Fourth Army to come
to their assistance near Hirsch and
Sedan respectively. the command of
the Third Army hesitated for quite a
while which call to heed. and finally
decided to help the Fourth Army.
"It would have been the proper
thing not to accede to either of the
two requests but to march straight
ahead in the directionfof Ritelms with
increased speed. By such a strategy
the Fourth Army would have gained
a lead which would have forced the
enemy to give up resistance and, fur-
thermore offered an opportunity to at-
tack the French forces fighting the
Second or Fourth Army._ in accord-
ance with the situation as a. whole.
But the command of the Third Army
acted contrary to the precepts of
Schlieffen. which, perhaps. had been
overemphasized in peace time. The
pursuit that would have overtaken
the French was left undone. Once
more an 'ordinary victory' was won.
Oficisl Reports Colored
To Make Pleasant Reading
"Another weak spot of the German
army, and of most of the other armies.
must be mentioned here: a. certain in-
clination to color reports. No front
officer will deny its existence. There
was a tendency to hide shortcomings
us much as possible and to set. the
troops in the best light under any cits
mantle”. Tbs real ~rnottvo._ no
doubt. was sssiduity. . V
stances it sprang from the financial
conditions of the individual who clung
to the union of an active officer or
was after unmanned pension. For
the not thnt reports were retouched
th-GoncruStsffcaredonlylnsofsr
as there was a danger of impairing the
nghtmg'powsr of the wu- machine-
For such was the case ‘Corrlgerlis
fortune‘ (to correct the fox-tufts)
during rifle and gun prude- under
m eat. We of how
seldom it was done. for it caused a“.
tactical , , ..,
0%: the or thst system VII
Mwi-ifizr .- '
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tin-vim, mount. may.
commode}; ~ m1 mm
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opt-1rd,
‘ A LIEUTENANT-COLONEL LOST THEW
Loafer isles rm
realm of- organm.‘
Mimosa.
up to the hoins‘ ‘
rave tactics 'wsrth’o dutyrodtfin’o
axioms 7 populous“. months
the spirit of military.
‘To ‘
4 .
. 0Q «. . .. _ z.
_,,,. .'m- . 3
Mt _ O. / '
,
' 3.th
Home xi:
2 ? a .‘ f 3, .‘o 70 einl
Kiloml
. or , o ESd'lcibncr-
THE GERMAN OFFENSIVES in. the WEST in l9i6 "
ever the temptation had been over-
come the subconscious desire not to
“spoil the picture which had had I
long standing.‘ caused many an 'ex-
hausted' and 'tircd' to be struck out
on the long road which the report had
to travel from the command of the di-
vision via the commands of the army
corps and army groups to the High
Command. Consequently. the High
Command lacked one of the most es-
sential foundations of real warfare.
namely the pure truth as to the con-
ditions of the troops, which ought to
have been reported no matter how bit-
ter and painful it would have been
to the reporting officer.
"Throughout the corps of German
officers the morale of the soldiers was
considered‘of too great importance.
while technical improvements were
neglected. To no other special assign-
ment were there {our} applications
than to the Academy of Militarv Tech-
nology. which was commonly known
as the 'Locksmith Academy: a term
that shown: that the German officer
considers it somewhat beneath his‘dig-
nity to study engineering. The fact
that the overwblemlng majority of the
officers thought so little of technology
is the best evidence that the leaders
of the army harbored the same view.
Otherwise, the leaders would have
brought about a change of views. as
they could have done.
"Fr-Om lock technology must
spring incorrect Judgment as tolthc
effect that'may be obtained through
the use of the various arms and
weapons, a mistake that must. be of
disadvantage when it.comes to esti-
mating the fighting powar of the
enemy. The tactics of the German in-
fantry in 1870 was unfavorably influ-
enced by such delusions; but. flushed
with victory. the Germans failed after.
wards to admit their shortcomings 0!
to take remedial measures.
Knowledge of Weapons,
Important Success Factor
“The conditions of 1870 existed still
in 1914. Numerous attacks. especially
those of the Yser in the latter part of
autumn. 1914. were I.- fauity as the.
attack of August ’18. 1870 (one of the
bottlcs of Mats) and sprang from the
some source. namely uncles-valuation
of the effectiveness,“ the enemy‘s
weapons and inability to understand
the lhnitations of an infantry attack.
Too low an estimate of the effective-
ness of the enemy’s fire was re-
sponsible .for the close formstiou'
of the German infantry? lino- in
action. At the bottom of that for
“nation. designed to bee: down the
enemy infantry by rifle and machine
tlonofother ummmflmstwn
of the effectiveness of the Ger-mania?
fantryflre.”
“1311914,-ths some
flea weronudo as in 1870._ m
“1m -
didnotprovcfatflin~ V ., _
thatwarlutodonlynlnomonthsnnd
mmmflnmt
‘ gerous to take
view-€-
mlssioned officer. who had to execute "
orders blindly and who were trained to
attack and advance without utilizing
available cover. Such tactics agreed
with the German character. but proved
fats! in the long run because of exces-
sive losses. 0:: the other hand. the
Punch soldier was encouraged to use
‘liis own Judgment and utilize any op-
portunity of keeping out of the view
and the bullets of the enemy.
"The German army manual pro-
claimed as an axiom that the field ar-
tillery while in action ought not to re-
sort to camouflage of any kind but
must occupy open or ‘half-covered'
positions for the sake of mobility. The
French field artillery was carefully
trained in the art of camouflage and
keeping out of sight.
"From sad experience in the Franco-
Prussian mu the French knew of the
moral effect of artillery fire on the
enemy and took it into consideration.
In his book 'L'Artlllerie dc Campos-no; '
which was approved by the French
Ministry of War. Lieutenant—Colonel
Paloquew'si’ys of the moral effect of ar-
tillery fire on infantry: ‘La. l'infanterle
eprouve,.a.vant de s'y engager. le ,sen-
iment que le terrain a parcourir. Ways
par les feux enemls, est trop danger-
oux pour qu'on puisse s'sventurer;
alle s’arrete. hesitantc et s’abrlte avant‘
'avoir souffert.’ (So has the infantry.
betel-c it engages itself. the feeling that
the territory whicbrmust be traversed
under the fire of the enemy is too dan-
a risk; hesitatlngly the
stops and seeks shag: befor;
l hassui'f'ered.) French man sspea
at! the ‘peur du shrapnel' (fear of the
shrapnel) which would prevent or ro-
duco the effectiveness of the employ.
ment of infantry. The official German
manuals as well as oral instructions
infantry
' utterly failed to consider the important
factor of impoudersbliities.
utumn, 1915. had failed in spite of
:mmense sacrifices in blood the Am“
decided to comerve their men and
substitute machines for soldiers as far
as possible. The Western Powers wore
always quicker to comprehend and
with the technical dlem‘slnd'tia:
warfare than the German es on
their extreme conservatism. go the
French and English made preparation,
to lobster the German front by ovary
windmills artillery are sad the .m-
pioyrnent of other mechanical devices
sndtobluutfortheirfruhtroopsg
road to victory. But it was not mm]
' ' ' that was subjected etc
the front was ‘1 ' When the
Juice in: m. whoftbo Somme
who the German front in s'ldtb"
of ' kilometers 81:: tErmine“
My. idiom ter- the! fruits
' urchin-opt their mum to
my home tbelr snows-fin tench“
m M 3.311 W‘ proper.
sufm'aerlnsnmghcmmandnnslly
qmfid in‘o'is he. otrmodcl'n techuiui '
or. m: F *“m': mien incl: .2... on .m
y»; brow out can
Gena-ail Ludendorff.
the Entente oflensive of.-
rigid. To save men positions were to
be ‘evacuated when to defend them
would havo meant too severe losses
from the enemy's artillery fire. But
the evacuation was scheduled to be
only temporary, for the duration, of
the devastating artillery fire. or, in
other words. not longer than to the
beginning of the attack by the infan~
try. At the end of the ensuing in-
fantry battle the defenders were ex-
pected to occupy their old positions.
“The deeper the Wedge the enemy
drove into the German lines. the
stronger and more energetic resis-
tance was to bé offered. Therefore
the defenders of our positions had to
be placed in such a way as to increase
the resistance of our lines in propor-
tion to the enemy's advahce.’ The
zone of defense was substituted for
the’line of defense; the fight had to
be conducted so as «to force the larger
losses on the enemy. There was not
any longer a standing order to hold
territory under any circumstancesfand
at any price. Such a {stubborn de~
tense was considered Justified only in
case evacuation, in the long run.‘
would have caused greater losses to
the Germans than the enemy would
have suflered by storming the posi-
tions. " "
"Extensive use ofnnechanicsl de-
vices had to be resentedfto in order
to save our own men and to crush the
fighting power of the enemy. Thus
cannon became the chief defensive
weapon even before the enemy started ‘
far as tho German
artillery directed on offensive fire
against the enemy. while the latter re-
stricted his own activities to the cm-
pioymcnt of mechanical devices.
Infantry Must Finish -
— Rspelling Mass Attack
"When the infantry attack began.
machine guns—the infantry machines
-——were chiefly relied upon for the do.
an attack. in so
tense though they were. cuppa-ted by‘
artillery fire. The ma‘chlnofgun nests
wore located chessbo'ardllke. but in
wider lines the farther back they
were from the front so that an un-
interrupted showor of lead oouid'bo
poured on. and Weaken the attacking
and “mixing enany.‘from all direc-
tions. Hit the final decision rested
with the man. according 139-321 1m-
mnbnble 41w. When the defensive ma-
chines baddesu'oyod the attack by n,
gnawing process. Ithocrcounoer-atwck
m defenders had to drive the at»,
toolbars back. All the machines could
do was to‘hnmpgr and restrict the
pm of tbecncmy; "oniy men-word
able torregain evacuated territory. '
rm the forflflcntion'ofg'podtlonl
undirvéeut 3 change. On coco ant. of
the indesori' MN? Quick firs 0931i.
mill-110' guns l: was hot new to
will the at.
‘fince * .‘L few
' > m
Innst‘whers the dcfenderl km! a.
views! the
may could”
I .
E n BER F GEN
placed underlay» the allied urtilo’
.. and thevfronf breached was“.
. M91! 3h! not 01999!- . ’
.. mg new defensive tactics come up
V defect. , ‘ to'expechfio‘ns in the.._,bltt1es, "of the that. on the
W3”: to Alene "“1111 thé Winfi'prik-funtry wield
4817. after it had not bean” properly Moped-emu .u nus!) number of
”mli'ed scalar thb‘ Edam spring
oflonslvc.‘ 191?; . *Therdsfmitmmu-‘m with
damn-w ads-amas- shme' sun- ‘atr- not“! W
I“ " . ‘ . . . _ not only thcnttscks fabed‘but choosimbr other
massesinsuchsn
their origi' actor, Nivelle. the: non
blood); was relieved of. his. position.
adapted bins-Km chasm
«Windchmm
fromthcres‘omcompnnytquigre-
servo. division—flew; .‘thoa enemy.
'_ from; iii-9W nun-lines. in‘
77: 0139. M 7 - "' -7' 1 7, 777L777 , _,
*‘Dtlriariths‘iumrtocma‘slssme’zh?“m"f 1"." ,Mpififi" 1 ”09;:
pushed withuthé ‘gre‘atesfesrnextncssru ,
distinct-sync Mmfie.lihemi m of . ,, ’
tanksmnflcfl fie;m,m:dhpenu.- .-
exoiuslwly‘ dash-1 valuation. winrwlfleh‘
the _ Gormsns_‘ had become ' virtuoa‘os.
had to give wavitofmsivesicnctms:
fundamental principles. -On:accbunt*
of technical unproven-rents the maa
chine, instead ‘of the individual in-
fantryman. was the most, effective
factor of rifle fire. The defense relied
chiefly on machine guns. against
which the infantry could- not any
longer prevail. The lnfantryman be-
. came about! to hand fighter .
German High command
Thought TanksVHarmless
"A dark spoflin the matter of arm-
ing the German army was the con-
, struction of the most modern fighting
machine. namely. the tank. The re»
sponsibiity did not rest with German
. private industry. At first,thc German,
High Command saw in the tank a mere
toy which, if deprived 'of its effects
on the morale. was a harmless
monster. 'The German soldiers. with
their strong nerves, it was said, would
treat the tanks as the ancient Ger.
mans had treated the lions let iobse
against them by the Romans, those
lions having been beaten to death
with clubszithout much ado by the
ancestors of the present day Germans.
The efficiency of the tank. which is
today universally recognized. was
pushed aside with the stereotyped
phrase of Tang; on!" as late as sum-
mer. 1918.
“That was technical atavism pure
and simple and a fateful return to the
pro-war antipathy against technical
progress. When the German tanks-—
which were. it is true, not very well
built—were inspected by the military
authorities the High Command consid-
ered them armored ammunition
trucks. while our enemies used the
tanks as armored batteries designed
to cooperate with the infantry. or as
armored machine gun nests.
"After the open formation of the
German defense lines in 1917 had
RMANY
vs-RAL STAFF
. W
, French Commandn-m-Chlef, m.
. as. 'buvsurr cums:— (drinker. or
' our.
, , , - ..attnc_ks were amndcvbywour. urinal—-
w-
shown that no artillery fire. no matter
.how mm: nud'domuang. could
destroy or put out of action-ovary m-
chlno-gun of the opposing forms. sud
ypor'dtlustuvmly
machine—guns.”tbo engin’cerseof'tho.
thl’tjho— gt.s..wm.fhct
’ 1nd 35t- rs.-
” .e'ooionotounoncss
they had max-nor their front line u-v
tsckcrs. .Thus the machine gun wu‘
the mother of the tank; ~‘
mmmm-r
t V .
. .~§A§:l¢pgusttbcmfilghflomo .., —
mtmtwhexmmusntor
11511. it Wmudsnocc prob-m...
F. .
able 7 that: the
with nearly» all artillery preparation,
and thereby. offers an ideal opportun-
ity to launch a surprise attack. as was
proved in the
bral.
Could Have Equaled‘ .
Success of Airplane Gun
"The German High Command con-
tinued to despite ‘ the new weapon-
Otherwise it would have been possible
to construct a tank as efficient as the
airplane gun which was likewise in-
vented during the war. Becausetho
tank was considered of minor impor-
tance by the German High Command.
the potential constructive forces of
German private industry were not util-
ized. It was much too late when the
engineers of private industry Were en—
listed. But when it was done. excellent
tanks of teh types ‘Obcrschlesien' and
‘Thyssen' were built. Mass production
could be started in 1919 (the year fol-
lowing the armistice). If that had
been done sooner, the German attacks
on the western front (meaning in
1918) would have had different re-
sults. -. ,
"The Pften repeated excuse that all&
the steel produced was consumed by
the ammunition factories and the navy
yards is not well founded. The navy
should have been restricted to stel
necessary to build submarines. Build-
ing of battleships and battle cruisers
was hardly as mportant as production
of tanks. The quantity of steel used
in 19171:: the construction of the
battleships Bayern. Hindenburg and
Mackensen' would have been sufficient
to manufacture several hundred tanks.
If used for the building of tanks. for
which. it Q alleged. it was not avail-
able. the steel would have been of
greater service than in the battle-
ships. the first cruise of which was to
Soaps Flow to be interned there."
1
.' :A DIAMOND RUSH
NEAR KIMBERLEY
, FEW days ago it was wild and
rocky void where only the
slinking Jackal could be seen.
A lone man prospecting had stumbled
across some small diamonds and in a
night the wilderness was replaced by
a medley of tents and tin shanties,
safes. dining rooms, stores. billiard
saloons and a merry-go-round blaring
forth noisily: This was Mosesberg.
which the South African Government
had made a. proclaimed area and de-
cided that. claims were to be pegged
out in the old fashioned style of a.
rush.
Mosesberg is sixty miles from Kim-
berley. On the day announced for the»
rush motor cars. ox wagons. donkey
wagons and a miscellaneous collection
of mining gear had assembled there.
The crowd of men included the old
hardened digger clad in corduroys and
chewing steadily. and a sprinkling of
youths. keen eyed and prepared to
race ln'khakl shirt and shorts. They
Were men .1; all nationalities. English,
Dutch, Jew and a sprinkling of K91,
‘firs. all grasping their pegs. on which
the owners’ names were painted in
bright colors.
"The «rush was to take place at 11
o'clock. As the hour drew near the
men toed the line between two white
flags. , For a distance of four miles
the rush extended. At five minutes
to 11 the Inspector of Claims mounted
a. rough box and a big Union Jack was
held up beside him. He began read-
ings. proclamatibn while the diggers
spat on their hansa’si’grasped their
pegs tightly and lowered their bodies
(fox-.the start. ,
With a. sudden flutter the Union
Jack was lowered. A yell of excite-
,ment went up from over a thousand
.volcesi‘fil‘ho men plunged forward.
running in all directions up the slope
of the kopjes facing them. It seemed
like the rout of some rabble army.
Gradually. .however. the fast moving
mass came to‘ a. standstill as. groups
began to peg; out claims. Mounted
police Were everywhere. giving in-
struction and advice to those partici-
pating in me rush.
-Among those who rushed were a.
n i ' arias! runners. sever-31pm-
torsional athletes being specially en-
‘ Within a few
thifxiountcd 1191109.th 'm'intervene. ‘
‘orehsacmmsr official was cailedin»
to settle the dispute.” f‘Tb’e claim is
yours,” he'wonidsay. muddy, and there
the maxmrwouldend— His Mes
was, .of the rough and ready fashion:
‘ Todflhudoffarmanimahadifl‘ ’
work. on. arrows, representing a animus v
kandshovelto, 7
hardly pag’g‘edont‘
'w
when he had about ten Kaffir boys dig.
glngit.
The Mosesberg rush will long be re-
membered. first because it was prob‘
ably the biggest rush in the history of
the diamond fields, and. second, be-
caufi there was a. total absence of
casualties. A Kimberley chemist with
an eye to business was on the scene
with bandages and lint. and as there
was no call for his services he also
participated in the rush. After the
rush was over it was seen that there
was still plenty of ground available for
some thousmds of diggers. good
ground on higher reaches of the hill-
sides where the alluvial deposits are
probably far better. richer and more
accessible than those scattered below.
No doubt this will soon be taken up.
as after seven days each digger is
permitted to peg five extra. claims. "
General Public Favors
Hotel for Women
HE general public no longer
fights shy of a woman's hotel.
They not only like it but pat-
ronize it. No better proof can be
found than the contemplated enlarge-
mfnt in the new Grace Dodge Hotel
restaurant this sunimer. made neces-
sary by the unexpectedly heavy pa-
tronage by men as well as W0n16-l'!.~
Plans for extensive alterations have
Just‘been completed by Dunmn Cand-
ler. architect of the hotel, which
opened last October in Washington.
“While hotel guest privileges are
extended to women only, our restau-
rant. tea house and tea. gardens are
open to the general public and have
also proven immensely popular with
men as well as ~women.” said Miss
Mary’ A. Lindsiey. manager. yester-
day. "Since the opening of our sum-
mer tea. service on the terraces and
in the hotel gardens many strangers
have-been attracted by our invitiugly
cool continental aspect."
Throughout the hotel is already in
its isdxmmer dress of cool ,chintzes and
a profusion of Men flowers. "Stop-
ping art!» Grace Dodge?” has be~
come a. natural inquiry to prominent
WomenE visiting Washington alone.
“So many events for which I came
to Washington ore sched' ' uied hero
anyway 31:31 I find it rmvcnieneo
to stun here’ ." said one woman promi- A
nent in 'women‘s organizations yes.
7 _t.erda.7tot.be'mmgur.
‘mw had made a. close study brute
sf tom of baloney. and "gain
were enrolled; in W exten—
I. of (“003,110. "
tank then for. tho—productionpofithate ..
Germans hagfrtoiglys up s
November-battle or Cam- ‘
_ " mama: intsadpxu‘hks‘md- .. ~
mmmcwmm m Egan‘s-sorrows. ‘rfil’ ~ “7;—
‘ ' ‘ upwemthlartvmu
tongue-loo. m ~m-&~
.22
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Norwalk Chronicler